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Abstract
This paper studies the design of the optimal non linear taxation in
an economy where longevity varies across agents, and depends on three
factors: longevity genes, health investment and farsightedness. Pro-
vided earnings, farsightedness and genes are correlated, governmental
intervention can be justied on two grounds: correction for a lack
of farsightedness and redistribution across both earnings and genetic
dimensions. Whether longevity-enhancing spending should be subsi-
dized or taxed is shown to depend on the combined e¤ects of myopia,
self-selection and free-riding on the annuity returns. Our policy con-
clusions depend also on how productivity and genes are correlated, on
the complementarity of genes and e¤orts in the survival function, and
on how the government weights the welfare of heterogeneous agents.
All in all, it might be desirable to tax longevity-enhancing spending.
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1 Introduction
Should the government subsidize longevity?
At rst glance, that question sounds more provocative than really rel-
evant, as this seems to question something unquestionable. Clearly, there
can be no doubt that the large rise in longevity that we are witnessing is a
good thing.1 Moreover, it seems also obvious that, keeping everything else
constant, more life is generally better than less life. Hence, it is tempting
to conclude that the government should intervene to promote longer lives.
However, by no way do those considerations necessarily imply that the
government has to intervene and inuence individual choices pertaining to
longevity. The reason why this is not the case is related to the - often implicit
- ceteris paribus postulate underlying the more is always betterbelief.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine the determinants of the optimal
subsidization of health spending in an economy where longevity is endoge-
nous.2 In particular, we shall argue that there might be some reasons why
the government should intervene negatively, and tax longevity, contrary to
the common sense (recommending the subsidization of longevity). Each of
those reasons involves a particular violation of the ceteris paribus postulate.
The rst reason is linked to the annuitization of savings when life duration
is uncertain. As shown by Becker and Philipson (1998), individuals do not
take into account, in their longevity-related choices, the negative e¤ect that
these choices can have on the cost of annuities, and, thus, on the return of
their savings. As a consequence, agents may tend to invest too much in their
health in comparison with what would maximize lifetime welfare.
The second reason is linked to redistribution. If richer individuals tend
to invest more in longevity-enhancing activities, it can be socially optimal to
tax them in a second-best setting wherein the social planner observes neither
productivity nor longevity genes. In other words, the taxation of longevity-
enhancing activities can serve as an indirect way to achieve social welfare
maximization in the context of asymmetric information.
Whereas those two reasons support the taxation of longevity-enhancing
health spending, the study of the optimal taxation under endogenous longevity
requires also to take into account other dimensions of the problem, which can
make individual choices suboptimal. In particular, there is another argument
that leads to an opposite policy, namely to subsidize longevity. If agents, be-
cause of their ignorance or myopia, do not perceive the deferred e¤ect that
1That intuition is conrmed by various preferences-based indicators of standards of
living taking longevity into account [see Becker et al (2005) and Murphy and Topel (2006)].
2As such, this is complementary to the studies by Bommier et al (2007a,b) focusing on
economies where longevity is exogenous.
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their savings and health care choices may have on their future consumption
and their longevity, such an imperfection of behavior invites some govern-
mental correction against individual underinvestment in health.
This paper proposes to re-examine the design of optimal taxation in an
economy where longevity is endogenous, and where the three considerations
discussed above interact. For that purpose, we develop a two-period model
where agents can inuence their probability of survival to the second period
by means of some rst-period health spending. Moreover, in order to do
justice to the heterogeneity of real populations, agents are here assumed to
di¤er in three characteristics: their productivity, their genetic background
and their degree of myopia.
At this early stage of our study, it might be worth highlighting four limi-
tations of this paper. First, we shall concentrate here on longevity-enhancing
e¤orts of monetary nature, and leave aside all other kinds of e¤orts promot-
ing longevity, such as temporal e¤orts (e.g. jogging) and physical e¤orts (e.g.
abstinence). Second, we shall focus on health spending that only concerns
the quantity of life, and not its quality. In other words, health spending shall
be here longevity-enhancing spending, which shall not a¤ect lifetime welfare
through other means than the mere lengthening of life. Third, this study will
rely on a static framework, and will leave aside various dynamic arguments
supporting the subsidization of longevity.3 Fourth, this normative discussion
will be - almost exclusively - carried out under the postulate of classical utili-
tarianism, which exhibits, in our context, two weaknesses. On the one hand,
the reliance of utilitarianism on consequentialism can hardly do justice to in-
tuitions about responsibility (as only outcomes matter); on the other hand,
the classical form of utilitarianism equalizes to zero the critical utility level
beyond which existence is desirable, which is also debatable.4 Thus classical
utilitarianism can only be justied on the grounds of analytical convenience.
Finally, although one may be skeptical and/or shocked in front of the
question raised by this paper, it should be stressed that the absence of theo-
retical discussions on an issue is generally more damageable than such discus-
sions, as the default option - i.e. the current practice - is often non-optimal.
Having stressed this, it is clear that this study does not have the preten-
sion to bring an exhaustive answer to the question of governmentsattitudes
towards longevity, but is only a rst step to be complemented by others.5
3For dynamic studies of optimal taxation on health spending, see Zhang et al (2006),
Jouvet et al (2007) and Pestieau et al (2008).
4See Broome (2004) on this.
5See Leroux et al (2008) for a study of the optimal linear taxation under endogenous
longevity when agents di¤er in productivity and genes. Other studies of optimal taxation
under endogenous longevity include Leroux (2008) and Leroux and Ponthiere (2008).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and describes the laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the
social optimum, and studies its decentralization under full information. The
second-best problem is examined in Section 4, under the postulate of comple-
mentarity between genetic endowment and health spending in the production
of longevity, and for various assumptions on the correlation between individ-
ual productivity and genetic background. Section 5 discusses the sensitivity
of our policy conclusions to some crucial assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
We consider a two-period model in which individuals live the rst period with
certainty, and the second one with a probability . The survival probability
 of an agent of type i depends on (rst-period) health expenditures ei, and
on a genetic (exogenous) characteristic "i:
i =  (ei; "i) (1)
where rst and second derivatives are such that e > 0, ee < 0, " > 0,
and "" < 0. We also assume that genetics and health expenditures are
complements, so that the impact of health expenditures is higher when the
individual has better genes (i.e. e" > 0).6 The function  (ei; "i) is a survival
probability, but it gives us also the actual proportion of survivors of type i.
Throughout this paper, we shall assume that agents do not necessarily
have a correct perception of their actual survival probability. They make
their saving and health spending decisions on the basis of a perceived survival
function ^i dened as:
^i = i (ei; "i) (2)
where the parameter i 2 [0; 1] (or rather 1  i) stands for the individuals
degree of ignorance or myopia.7 People with a low i hardly realize that they
can lengthen their life by investing ei even though it is true, while people with
i = 1 fully internalize the impact of their e¤ort on their longevity.
6We believe that this assumption is more plausible than that of substitutability. The
robustness of our results to this assumption is examined in Section 5.2 below.
7Note that this specication of agentsmyopia is here made for conveniency. Assum-
ing i < 1 amounts to consider that agents tend systematically to underestimate their
probability of survival (i.e. pessimism). Naturally, other, more general assumptions could
be made on agentsmyopia (allowing, for instance, optimism), but these would induce
additional subcases for our analysis without bringing new insights.
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Individuals di¤er in three dimensions: their genetic characteristics "i,
their degree of myopia i, and their labor productivity wi. Whereas both "i
and wi are assumed to be non observable, i is common knowledge.
Lifetime welfare is assumed to be additive over time, and temporal welfare
depends on consumption during the period. Setting the discount and interest
rates equal to zero and assuming that the utility of being dead is normalized
to zero, the expected lifetime utility of an individual of type i is given by:
U (ci; di; li) = u (ci) + i (ei; "i)u (di)  v (li) (3)
where ci and di denote the consumption in rst and second period respec-
tively, li is the labor supply in the rst period. Per period utility of con-
sumption, u () is such that u0 () > 0 and u00 (:) < 0. The disutility of labor
is increasing and strictly convex: v0 () > 0 and v00 () > 0:
2.2 The laissez-faire
We assume that individuals invest all their savings on a perfect annuity mar-
ket. An individual of type i chooses his savings si and his health expenditure
ei by solving the following problem:
max u (ci) + i (ei; "i)u (di)  v (li)
s.t.

ci = wili   si   ei
di = siRi
where Ri is the return on saving, which is taken as given. FOCs are
u0 (ci)wi = v0 (li) (4)
u0 (ci) = u0 (di)Rii (ei; "i) (5)
u0 (ci) = ie (ei; "i)u (di) (6)
We assume that the market for annuities is actuarially fair, so that:
Ri =
1
 (ei; "i)
with a zero rate of interest. Note that the return of the annuity depends
on the actual survival of individual. Equation (4) is standard: the marginal
rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equal to the wage rate.
Equation (5) denes the optimal level of savings. If the individual is perfectly
rational (i = 1), consumption is smoothed (ci = di); on the contrary, for any
i < 1, rst period consumption is higher than second period consumption.
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Equation (6) yields the level of health investment. The LHS of this equa-
tion is the utility cost associated to foregone consumption while the RHS is
the utility gain from a larger health spending, which depends on the util-
ity of the second period consumption, on the e¤ect of health spending on
longevity, but, also, on the degree of rationality of the agent. Note that the
level of health spending decreases with the degree of myopia. Moreover, in
the laissez- faire, the individual takes the return of the annuity as given, and
does not internalize the impact of his health spending on the annuity return.
This behavioral imperfection was rst highlighted by Becker and Philipson
(1998): when choosing their longevity e¤ort, individuals face a free-rider
problem, and choose their longevity e¤ort without taking into account that
it a¤ects the annuity price.8 Thus, as it will appear, the laissez-faire level of
health spending is, in the absence of myopia, higher than the optimal one.
3 Paternalistic optimum
In this study, the social planner is assumed to be utilitarian and paternalistic.
By a utilitarianplanner, we mean that the planner pursues the stan-
dard Benthamite goal of the maximization of the sum of individual utilities.
That ethical framework su¤ers from several weaknesses in our context. In
particular, its reliance on consequentialism makes it hard to account for is-
sues of responsibility (as only outcomes matter from a consequentialist point
of view). Moreover, as this is well-known in the population ethics litera-
ture, utilitarianism in its classical form exhibits limitations in the context
of varying longevity: this regards any life with a positive (even extremely
low) utility level as desirable.9 Thus, classical utilitarianism should only be
regarded as an - analytically attractive - starting point for the issue at stake.
By paternalisticplanner, we mean that the planner uses, in his maxi-
mization program, the true survival probability, and not the one perceived
by individuals. The social planners motivation is standard in self-control
problems: the planner knows that individuals will be grateful to him to have
forced them to behave according to their true survival probabilities.
8The intuition goes as follows: each person, by considering himself as one among a
multitude of agents, believes that he cannot inuence the return on savings through his
own survival, even though it happens to do so.
9On this, see Broome (2004).
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3.1 First-best solution
In the rst-best setting, the central planner observes the types of individuals,
namely their productivity and genes, and ignores any myopia. Its problem is
thus to maximize.X
ni

u (ci) +  (ei; "i)u (di)  v

yi
wi

subject to the resource constraint of the economyX
ni (ci + ei +  (ei; "i) di   yi) = 0 (7)
where ni is the proportion of individuals of type i, namely with characteristics
"i, wi and i. For simplicity, we also replace wili by yi, the gross income
earned by an individual with productivity wi. The FOCs of this problem can
be rearranged as
v0 (li) = wi (8)
u0(ci) = u0(di) =  (9)
e (ei; "i)u (di) =  [1 + e (ei; "i) di] (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
First, from equation (8), individuals with higher productivity should supply
more labor li than individuals with lower productivity. Second, equation (9)
shows that consumption should be equalized for all types periods, ci = di =
c 8i. This is a direct implication of both utilitarianism and of additivity
across periods in individual lifetime utility.
Equation (10) gives the optimal level of health expenditure. Rearranging
it, we obtain
e (ei; "i) =
F
1  cF (11)
where F  u0 (c) =u (c) is called fear of ruinand is an alternative measure
of risk aversion.10
Comparing (11) with its laissez-faire counterpart (6), which can be re-
arranged as e (ei; "i) = F=i, this condition di¤ers on two grounds. With
i = 1, the rst-best FOC di¤ers from the laissez-faire FOC (6) by a term
 cF in the denominator, which reects the impact of health spending on
the budget set. This is the Becker-Philipsone¤ect (hereafter, referred as
the BP e¤ect). The rst-best level of health spending is thus lower than the
laissez-faire one. This rst-best expression also di¤ers from the laissez-faire
10On the fear of ruin, see Eeckhoudt and Pestieau (2008).
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by i. In the rst-best, the impact of e¤ort on survival is fully internalized:
this contributes to make the rst-best e¤ort exceed its laissez-faire level.
Since both e¤ects (Becker-Philipson and myopia) go into opposite directions,
whether the rst-best level of e¤ort is superior or inferior to the laissez-faire
one is not clear.
Note that in the rst-best, health spending are di¤erentiated according
to genetic endowment "i, but not with respect to the degree of rationality
of individuals i. Assuming, in a paternalistic way, that i = 1 8i leads the
social planner to redistribute only according to individual genetic endowment
and labor productivity, but not according to their degree of myopia.11
According to equation (11), the di¤erential value of ei only depends on
"i. It is immediate to see that "i > "j implies ei > ej if "e > 0, that is, if
both arguments are complements. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we
focus on the cases where type-2 agents are tempted to mimic type-1 agents.
This possibility appears if
u (c2) + 2 ("2; e2)u (c2)  v (l2)  u (c1) + 2 ("2; e1)u (c1)  v

y1
w2

where the values ci, di, yi, li and ei are those of the rst-best, and para-
meters "2 and w2 are not common knowledge. For such a mimicking to be
possible, it is essential that type-2 agents benet from characteristics w2 and
"2 that, in combination, imply a social redistribution that they would prefer
to avoid, which is possible if those characteristics are not observable. The
rst-best optimum implies transfers from individuals with the higher pro-
ductivity towards the ones with the lower productivity, but, also, transfers
from individuals with the worse genetic background towards the ones with
the better genetic background. This is the consequence of our social welfare
function. We come back to that issue below.
3.2 Decentralization
Let us now consider how the above paternalistic optimum can be decentral-
ized. In the following, we assume that the instruments available to the social
planner are: individualized linear taxes on labor  i, on health i, and on
savings i, as well as individualized lump sum transfers Ti. We also assume
that the annuity market is actuarially fair, so that Ri = 1= (ei; "i) prevails
at the equilibrium. The individuals problem is thus to maximize:
u (wili (1   i)  si (1 + i)  ei (1 + i) + Ti)  v (li) + i (ei; "i)u (Risi)
11One may interpret this in the following way: agents are not held responsible for their
myopia, because the social planner corrects their decisions.
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Solving this problem, we obtain the following FOCs,
v0 (li)
u0 (ci)
= wi (1   i) (12)
iu
0 (di)
u0 (ci)
= 1 + i (13)
ie (ei; "i)u (di)
u0 (ci)
= 1 + i (14)
We then compare these FOCs with the FOCs (8)-(10) of the rst-best to see
how the optimum can be decentralized with our tax instruments. We easily
obtain the following values for the taxes:
 i = 0
i = i   1 6 0
i = [1 + e (ei; "i) di]i   1
The social optimum can be reached with a zero tax on labor. It is optimal
to subsidize savings for any agent of type i with i < 1. This is simply to
correct for individual myopia: since myopic agents do not save enough in the
laissez-faire, it is optimal to subsidize their savings so as to encourage them
to save more. In the absence of myopia (i.e. i = 1), the tax i is zero.
On the contrary, the sign of i is ambiguous, as it depends on two counter-
vailing e¤ects. To see this, let us rst assume that individuals are fully ratio-
nal (i.e. i = 1). In this case, health spending is taxed and i = e (ei; "i) di.
This is to correct for the overspending in health noted by Becker-Philipson
(1998): in order to make agents choose the optimal level of health spending,
one has to tax health expenditures. Let us now assume that there is no BP
e¤ect and that the individual perfectly anticipates the e¤ect of his health
spending on the annuity return. In this case, i = i   1 and it would be
optimal to subsidize health expenditures so as to counterbalance the e¤ect
of myopia, which makes individuals invest too little in their health. Thus,
depending on the magnitude of these two e¤ects, i is positive or negative.
Table 1 summarizes the impact of both MO (myopia) and BP e¤ects on
the level of taxes on savings, health expenditures and labor:
Table 1: First-best taxation
Taxes BP MO Total e¤ect
i 0 - -
i + - ?
 i 0 0 0
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Note nally that since the subsidy on savings depends on i, agents with
di¤erent degrees of myopia will face di¤erent subsidies; yet, this tax does not
depend on the other individual characteristics (wi; "i). In contrast, the level
of taxes/subsidies on health expenditures will depend not only on the agents
degree of myopia, but, also, on his genetic background through the survival
probability  (ei; "i). For instance, an individual with a very good genetic
background and a low degree of myopia may face a tax on health spending,
while an individual with a low genetic background but a high myopia might
be subsidized in the rst-best.
To achieve the FB solution, we need the above taxes or subsidies, but,
also, appropriate lump sum taxes. Under i = 1, the tax structure will be
such that ci = di = c and e (ei; "i) is constant. With equal "i, if w2 > w1,
the lump sum tax would redistribute from type-2 agents to type-1 agents,
to allow both of them to make the same choices. Unequal "i along with
complementarity of ei and "i imply that, if "2 > "1, the redistribution will go
from type-1 agents to type-2 agents. Which one of the two redistributions
dominates is uncertain. To the extent that we want to focus on the case
where type-2 agents mimic type-1 agents, we shall, in the rest of this paper,
adopt the characteristicsvalues that give us this outcome.
4 Second-best non linear taxation
4.1 Incentive constraints and the planners problem
We now turn to the second-best case wherein the social planner cannot ob-
serve individualstypes (wi; "i). By assumption, the degree of myopia is still
observable, and, for simplicity, 1 = 2 < 1. Let us consider two types of
agents with characteristics (w1; "1) and (w2; "2). Under asymmetric informa-
tion, whether type-1 agents mimic type-2 agents or the reverse depends on
whether w1 ? w2 and "1 7 "2. Four cases can be distinguished:
 Case A: w2 > w1 and "1  "2
 Case B: w2 > w1 and "1 < "2
 Case C: w2 < w1 and "1 > "2
 Case D: w2 < w1 and "1  "2
Substituting the rst-best allocation into the incentive constraint, it is
straightforward to see that under asymmetric information, type-2 agents will
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always mimic type-1 agents in case A.12 Such a mimicking will also occur in
case B if the gap between "1 and "2 is small relative to the productivity gap,
and in case C if the genetic gap is high relative to the productivity gap. In
case D, type-2 agents have never interest in mimicking type-1 agents. We
will thus exclude case D, and suppose that the most realistic case is B, where
genes and productivities are positively correlated.
Hence, only considering the cases where type-2 agents mimic type-1 agents,
the social planners problem can be expressed by the following Lagrangian:
$ =
X
ni

u (ci) +  (ei; "i)u (di)  v

yi
wi

   (ci + ei +  (ei; "i) di   yi)

+

u (c2) + 2 (e2; "2)u (d2)  v

y2
w2

+

 u (c1)  2 (e1; "2)u (d1) + v

y1
w2

where  is the multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint.
The FOCs of this second-best problem are:
u0 (c1)

1  
n1

   = 0
u0 (c2)

1 +

n2

   = 0
 (e1; "1)u
0 (d1)  2 (e1; "2)
n1
u0 (d1)   (e1; "1) = 0
 (e2; "2)u
0 (d2)

1 +
2
n2

   (e2; "2) = 0
e (e1; "1)u (d1)  [1 + e (e1; "1) d1] = 
n1
2e (e1; "2)u (d1)
e (e2; "2)u (d2)   [1 + e (e2; "2) d2] =   
n2
2e (e2; "2)u (d2)
v0

y1
w1

1
w1
    
n1
v0

y1
w2

1
w2
= 0
v0

y2
w2

1
w2

1 +

n2

   = 0
12Replacing for rst best allocations in individualsutility functions, it is possible to
prove that individual i has interest in claiming to be of type j whenever
v

yj
wi

  v

yi
wi

+ i [ (ei; "i)   (ej ; "i)]u (di)  0
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Rearranging these FOCs, we obtain the following marginal rates of substitu-
tion (MRS):
u0 (d2)
u0 (c2)
= 1 +

n2
(1  2)u0 (d2) (15)
u0 (d1)
u0 (c1)
= 1 +

n1

2 (e1; "2)
 (e1; "1)
  1

u0 (d1) (16)
e (e2; "2)u (d2)
u0 (c2)
= [1 + e (e2; "2) d2] +

n2
e (e2; "2)u (d2) [1  2](17)
e (e1; "1)u (d1)
u0 (c1)
= [1 + e (e1; "1) d1]
+

n1
u (d1) [2e (e1; "2)  e (e1; "1)] (18)
v0

y2
w2

u0 (c2)
= w2 (19)
v0

y1
w1

u0 (c1)
= w1   
n1

v0

y1
w2

w1
w2
  v0

y1
w1

(20)
To interpret these expressions, assume rst that i = 1. When  = 0, we are
in the FB setting. The only discrepancy with the LF solution is in (17) and
(18) and is due to the BP e¤ect.
Let us reintroduce the self-selection constraint and keep i = 1: Equations
(15) and (16) indicate that the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) property applies to
saving by type 2 but not by type 1. With complementarity of " and e; we
have
u0 (d1)
u0 (c1)
? 1 depending on "2 ? "1
The intuition behind that result goes as follows. If, for example, the mimicker
has better genes ("2 > "1), he has higher chances to live longer than the
mimicked individual and thus would like to save more for his retirement. It
then makes sense to tax saving by the mimickee, which relaxes the incentive
compatibility constraint. Again with i = 1, Equation (17) is not changed.
As to (18), the factor of  is positive (negative) if "2 > (<) "1. If "2 > "1, both
the incentive e¤ect and the BP e¤ect go in the same direction, so that it is
optimal to tax health expenditures. Indeed, as the mimicker has better genes
than the mimickee, he would like to invest more in his health, and thus taxing
health spending by the mimickee relaxes the incentive constraint. In contrast,
if "2 < "1, the incentive constraint and the BP e¤ect have countervailing
e¤ects, so that whether health expenditures should be subsidized or taxed
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is not clear. This depends on the magnitude of these two e¤ects. Finally,
concerning the choice of labor, there is no distortion for type 2 and there is
the standard downward distortion for type 1.
As it appears, the myopia parameters appear in the above formulas, but
they also appear in the LF optimal choices. This is why we now combine
equations (15)-(20) and equations (12)-(14) to obtain the tax formulas.
4.2 Tax formulas
From equations (12)-(14) and (15)-(20), one can derive:
1 = 1
"
1  
n1
1  2(e1;"2)
n1(e1;"1)
#
  1
2 = 2
"
1 + 
n2
1 + 2
n2
#
  1
1 = 1 [1 + e (e1; "1) d1]
"
1  
n1
1  2e(e1;"2)
n1e(e1;"1)
#
  1
2 = 2 [1 + e (e2; "2) d2]
"
1 + 
n2
1 + 2
n2
#
  1
 1 = 1 
1  
n1
1  
n1
v0(y1=w2)
v0(y1=w1)
w1
w2
 2 = 0
Note that, in those formulas, the myopia parameter appears as a factor of
the MRS for health spending and saving, as well as in the MRS itself.
To interpret these tax formulas, we again start with the case without
myopia (i.e. i = 1 8i). In the second-best, the tax-subsidy instruments
are going to be used also to relax the incentive compatibility constraints,
preventing type-2 agents from mimicking type-1 agents. Not surprisingly,
this will depend on the distribution of the two characteristics. To see this, let
us study the three alternative cases considered above, while noting that the
no distortion at the top rule applies consistently to type-2 agents. In other
words, there is no distortion on the choice of labor and saving, and if there
is any distortion on the choice of health care, it is due to the BP e¤ect.
Let us recollect our three alternative cases:
A. negative correlation between genetics and productivity;
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B. positive correlation between genetics and productivity but the produc-
tivity gap dominates the genetic gap;
C. positive correlation between genetics and productivity but the produc-
tivity gap is dominated by the genetic gap.
In the alternative A, type 2 dominates type 1 in productivity but not in
genetics. The incentive compatibility (hereafter IC) e¤ect thus leads to a tax
on earnings and a subsidy on health spending and saving by type 1. This is
what shows column 2 of Table 2. In the alternative B, type 2 dominates type
1 in both productivity and genetics. He is expected to work more, to spend
more on health and on saving. To prevent him from mimicking type 1, one
has to tax earnings, health care and saving of type 1. In the alternative C,
type 2 has worse genes and a lower productivity than type 1. Reasoning as
above, the IC e¤ect implies a subsidy on earnings, on saving and on health
expenditure by type 1.
Naturally, as far as health expenditure is concerned, both the BP and
the IC e¤ects are to be combined, which gives a clear-cut tax in the second
alternative and an ambiguous result in the rst and the third ones.
Finally, let us consider the second-best with myopia. As in rst-best, the
presence of myopia implies a subsidy on both saving and health spending by
the two types of individuals. In the case we had no tax or subsidy without
myopia, we now have a subsidy. In the case we had a tax, we now have an
ambiguous result. These various e¤ects are presented on Table 2.
To interpret our aggregate results, let us focus on Case B, which seems
to be the most plausible case. In that case, the second-best policy involves
a tax on the earnings of agents with a low productivity and bad genes (and
no tax on the earnings of agents with a high productivity and good genes),
as well as a subsidy on the savings of agents with a high productivity and
good genes. However, it is not obvious to see the sign of optimal taxation on
health spending. As in the rst-best, myopia (MO) recommends, for the two
types of agents, a subsidization of longevity, while the BP e¤ect recommends
a taxation. But, in addition, the incentive compatibility (IC) supports a tax
on the health spending of agents with low productivity and bad genes. As a
result of those countervailing e¤ects, it is not easy to see whether longevity-
enhancing spending should be taxed or subsidized.
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Table 2: Signs of taxes in the second-best
second-best BP IC MO Total e¤ect
Case A: 1 0 - - -
w2 > w1 2 0 0 - -
and "1  "2 1 + - - ?
2 + 0 - ?
 1 0 + 0 +
 2 0 0 0 0
Case B: 1 0 + - ?
w2 > w1 2 0 0 - -
and "1 < "2 1 + + - ?
2 + 0 - ?
 1 0 + 0 +
 2 0 0 0 0
Case C: 1 0 - - -
w2 < w1 2 0 0 - -
and "1 > "2 1 + - - ?
2 + 0 - ?
 1 0 - 0 -
 2 0 0 0 0
Given that the signs of several instruments are ambiguous, it is necessary,
to have more precise conclusions, to complement that qualitative analysis by
some numerical simulations under particular functional forms for individual
utility functions and for survival functions. That task is carried out in the
Appendix of the paper.
5 Discussions
Let us come back to the three assumptions that play a key role in our model.
The rst crucial assumption concerns the distributions of w and " in the
population, the second assumption concerns the degree of substitutability
between " and e in the production of longevity, and the third assumption
consists of the social criterion used (classical utilitarianism).
5.1 The productivity / genes correlation
Concerning the rst assumption, there is little doubt that, in the real world,
there exists a large number of types regarding our two characteristics. Agents
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exhibiting a high productivity do not necessarily benet from good longevity
genes, and agents with bad longevity genes may nonetheless turn out to
be highly productive. Hence, under two sources of heterogeneity, we should
ideally consider four - instead of two - types of agents (leaving myopia aside).
Nonetheless, for reason of analytical treatment, we limited ourselves here
to two types of agents, and, under this restriction, we argued that the most
realistic case is, at their glance, the existence of a positive correlation between
the characteristics " and w (i.e. ruling out Case A). Further, to the extent we
want type-2 agents to mimic type-1 agents, the most realistic case is the one
with positive correlation between " and w and the productivity gap larger
than the genetic gap (with complementarity), that is, Case B.
While those restrictions - and the resulting emphasis on Case B - facilitate
the exposition of the problem, it should be stressed here that assumptions on
the relationship between productivity and longevity genes are not straight-
forward to make. The reason why those assumptions are somewhat fragile
lies mainly in the di¢ culty to identify what we call the longevity genes. The
genetic background is so large that it is not obvious to see what longevity
genesconsist of, and the precise denition of those longevity genesmay
a¤ect the plausibility of the di¤erent cases. One cannot rule out a priori
that some longevity genes are positively correlated with productivity, while
others are negatively correlated with longevity, so that assumptions at the
aggregate level should be made with caution.
Thus, even though Case B seems, at rst sight, to be the most plausible
one, other cases should not be ignored, and this is why we studied also the
other cases for completeness.
5.2 The production of longevity
Regarding the degree of substitutability between e and ", we believe that the
assumption of complementarity is the most realistic one. This means that
having good genes implies that for the same amount of e¤ort, one increases
his survival probability more than someone with bad genes.
Having stressed this, it should be underlined that substitutability, al-
though less plausible, is far from impossible. In order to illustrate the issue
at hand, let us consider the following example. Suppose we have two indi-
viduals endowed with a di¤erent metabolism and striving to achieve an ideal
weight. For the one with a favorable metabolism, just a little e¤ort will al-
low him to reach his ideal weight. However, for the other person, even with
enormous e¤orts, it will be mission impossible. In the light of that example,
the case of complementarity does not seem as strong as it may appear at rst
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sight.13 Given that the empirical testing of those two assumptions can hardly
be made (because of the reason mentioned above regarding the identication
of longevity genes), it makes sense to explore the policy consequences of
departing from complementarity of " and e.
To see the implication of adopting the assumption of substitutability, we
contrast on Table 3 the tax rates under substitutability and complementarity
for the case B (i.e. positive correlation between w and e and the productivity
gap dominating the genetic gap).
Table 3: Complementarity versus substitutability
Case B: BP IC (i = 1) MO Total e¤ect
positive correlation (wi; "i)
Complementarity 1 0 + - ?
2 0 0 - -
1 + + - ?
2 + 0 - ?
 1 0 + 0 +
 2 0 0 0 0
Substitutability 1 0 + - ?
2 0 0 - -
1 + ? - ?
2 + 0 - ?
 1 0 + 0 +
 2 0 0 0 0
As one can see from Table 3, going from complementarity to substi-
tutability only inuences the IC e¤ect for 1, as it only a¤ects the ratio
e (e1; "2) =e (e1; "1). Thus we now have an ambiguous sign for 1, whereas
it was positive with complementarity.14
5.3 Classical utilitarianism
Finally, there is a key assumption that we have made up to now, and which
has some bearing on the result: it is the classical utilitarian objective func-
tion. When combined with the standard additive lifetime welfare assump-
tion, the classical utilitarian criterion amounts to impose a redistribution
13Actually, that example supports some substitutability of genes and e¤ort in the pro-
duction of longevity, for which a general expression is given by the following CES function:
 (e; ") = (e + ")
=, where  6 1 and  < 1:
14See the Appendix for a numerical comparison of the complementarity and substi-
tutability cases.
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from short-lived to long-lived individuals.15 Such a redistribution can be
questioned, as it is not obvious to see why an individual should be penal-
ized because he lives a shorter life than other individuals. Intuitively, one
would prefer, on the contrary, to see short-lived agents compensated for
their short life, for which they are not responsible. Classical utilitarianism
does not allow for such a compensation.
In order to avoid the counter-intuitive redistributive bias in favor of long-
lived agents, there is no other solution than to depart from the standard
utilitarian optimization problem described above. This can be done in several
manners. One intuitive solution is to modify the weighting of individual
utilities.16 Whereas classical utilitarianism weights equally the utility of all
agents, and of all life-periods, one may depart from such a weighting of
utilities in two ways. One can put a higher weight on the lifetime utility of
the short-lived individuals, or, alternatively, one can put a higher weight on
the second-period utility of the short-lived individuals.
For the sake of illustration, let us put a higher weight on the second-
period utility of the short-lived individuals. If we take our benchmark case
B and focus on the rst-best, the Lagrange expression can be rewritten as:X
ni [u (ci) + i (ei; "i)u (di)  v (li)
  (ci + ei +  (ei; "i) di   wili)]
where 2 = 1 and 1 > 1:
As before, we have c1 = c2 and l2 > l1: But now we have: d1 > d2: Type-1
agents will consume more during his second period than type-2 agents. If
we move to the second-best, those weights make the mimicking of type-1 by
type-2 individuals more attractive than without the modied weights. Note,
however, that this does not change the self-selection constraint as long as the
mimicked individuals are also those having a low longevity.
6 Conclusions
This paper studied the optimal non-linear taxation policy in a two-period
economy where the probability of survival to the second period depends on
genetic background and on health spending. Agents were assumed to be
15For a criticism of that redistribution, see Bommier et al (2007b).
16Another solution, not explored in this paper, is to keep the standard utilitarian crite-
rion, but do as if all agents have the same genetic background (even though it is not the
case). Such a paternalistic approach amounts to x "i = " for all agents in the objective
function, while keeping group-specic "i in incentive compatibility constraints.
18
heterogeneous on three dimensions: longevity genes, earnings capacity and
the degree of myopia. The social planner was assumed to be of the standard,
classical utilitarian type, that is, maximizing the sum of individual utilities,
but using the true and not the perceived survival probability.
In the rst-best, i.e. when the social planner observes individual charac-
teristics, the decentralization of the optimum calls for Pigouvian actions that
consist of a subsidy to foster health spending and saving in case of myopia,
and of a tax to discourage health spending to the extent that individuals do
not see the impact of increased longevity on the returns of annuities.
In the second-best, beyond these Pigouvian actions, the non-observability
of productivity and genetic endowment implies a self-selection constraint
leading to a tax or a subsidy on saving, health spending and earnings for
the mimicked agents, depending on the relative values of non observable
characteristics. Whether health and saving ought to be subsidized or taxed
depends on the combined e¤ects of myopia, self-selection and free-riding on
the annuity returns.
Take, for instance, the benchmark case of positive correlation with the
productivity gap dominating the genetic gap, and of complementarity be-
tween health spending and genetic endowment. In the absence of myopia,
we have a tax on earnings, health spending and saving for agents with low
productivity and genes, and a tax on health spending for agents with high
productivity and genes. Note that taxing saving and also health care violates
the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem, but such a violation follows from the
existence of two characteristics (see Cremer et al., 2004). The tax on health
spending can also appear quite surprising. However, we have to remember
that redistribution is here implemented by the optimal tax on earnings, and
that the type of health we have here in mind is mainly consumed by the mim-
icker (i.e. agents with good genes). Moreover, once myopia is introduced,
there is a countervailling argument for subsidizing health care.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized here that the present study, by re-
lying mainly on classical utilitarianism, su¤ers from the limitations of that
ethical framework in the context of varying longevity.17 In particular, the
utilitarian bias in favor of agents with good genes is quite counter-intuitive.
Intuitively, one would prefer agents with a bad genetic background to be com-
pensated for this, on the grounds that these are not responsible for having
bad longevity genes. But utilitarianism, by relying on consequentialism, can
hardly do justice to such responsibility-based intuitions. In order to discuss
the sensitivity of our results to the utilitarian postulate, we considered an
alternative social welfare function in which we abandon the utilitarian bias
17See Broome (2004) on the problems raised by longevity for teleological ethical systems.
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in favor of long-lived individuals. As we showed, giving more social weight
to the short-lived individuals increases redistribution in their favor, but does
not change the self-selection constraint as long as the mimicked agents are
also those having a low longevity.
However, given the singularity, from an ethical point of view, of the
longevity dimension, that slight departure from the Benthamite social wel-
fare function invites several other departures, allowing us to explore in more
depth the sensitivity of policy recommendations to the postulated ethical
framework. In the light of the well-known di¢ culties to accommodate util-
itarianism with intuitions about responsibility and compensation, there can
be no doubt that much work remains to be done in the future.
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7 Appendix: a numerical example
We here present some numerical examples that illustrate our cases A and B
under the alternative assumptions of complementarity and substitutability
between genes and health spending. We adopt the following specications
for the various components of our model. Per period utility of consumption
and desutility of labour are expressed as follows:
u (c) =
c1 
1  
v (l) =
l2
2
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion; it is set equal to 0:8.
We also use the following forms for the survival probabilities in the cases of
complementarity (c) and substitutability (s) between health spending and
genes:
 (e; ")c =
"
1 + "
e
1 + e
 (e; ")s =
(e+ ")1=2
1 + (e+ ")1=2
Note that both formulations ensure that the survival probability is always
lower or equal to one. As in our theoretical model, we assume two groups
of individuals with productivites w1 = 1 < w2 = 10. As to the genetic
endowment, we assume "1 = 1 and let "2 vary. We nally assume  = 0:9,
so that individuals have an identical and low degree of myopia.
The following table presents the levels of taxes on savings, health and
labour under the assumption of complementarity between genes and health
expenditure for the mimickee, under asymmetric information.
"2 0.2 0.5 0.8 1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2 3
tax on savings (1) -0.27 -0.21 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
tax on health (1) -0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.28
tax on labour ( 1) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26
Note that when "2 2 [0; 1[, productivity and genes are negatively cor-
related, so that we are in our theoretical case A. On the contrary, for any
"2  1, it corresponds to case B. Irrespectively of cases A or B, we have a tax
on earnings. As "2 increases, we go from a subsidy to a tax on health. We
have a subsidy on saving except when the genetic gap becomes large enough
22
making it worthwhile to tax saving. These results are consistent with our
theoretical ndings (see Table 2).
Our second table presents the results under the assumption of substi-
tutability between genes and health spending, only in our benchmarck case
B of positive correlation between genes and productivity with a productivity
gap dominating the genetic gap.
"2 1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2 3
tax on savings (1) -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10
tax on health (1) 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.06
tax on labour ( 1) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
As expected, the assumption of substitutability does not change the sign of
 1; it is still optimal to tax earnings. On the contrary, we now nd that
health should be subsidized for "2 > 1:8. As to saving, we have a subsidy
for all the values of "2, whereas with complementarity, we have a tax for a
large genetic gap. This is consistent with the theory. With substitutability
a higher genetic endowment calls for less and not more health spending. As
one can see the subsidy decreases with "2.
Finally, we would like to see how the results change when we assign
di¤erent social weights to individuals with di¤erent genes. We consider case
B and we want the weight to neutralize genetic di¤erences. This can be done
by writing the lifetime utility of our two types as follows:
U (ci; di; li) = u (ci) + i (ei; "i)u (di)  v (li)
with i = (1 + "i) ="i. With such a weighting, we obtain the following tax
values:
"2 1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2 3
tax on savings (1) -0.14 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.004 0.08
tax on health (1) 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.35
tax on labour ( 1) 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Comparing these values with those obtained without weight we observe
that the tax on both earnings and health is higher and the subsidy on saving is
lower. This is due to the fact that with our weights, redistribution from type
2 to type 1 is more important. To achieve it under asymmetric information
we need higher taxes or lower subsidies to satisfy the self selection constraint.
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